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Ownership structure and performance: An empirical application with panel data in the context of 
Portuguese SMEs 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the causal relationship between the ownership concentration, insider ownership and 
profitability using a sample of 4163 Portuguese SMEs and panel data methodology. The results show an 
endogenous and dynamic relationship between the variables. The quadratic specification established between 
ownership concentration and profitability suggests that for low levels of control rights the expropriation 
hypothesis prevails and for high levels the supervision hypothesis prevails. It was also possible to validate the 
effect of entrenchment and convergence of interests in the relationship established between the insider ownership 
and profitability. The relationships established suggest a reciprocal causality between the variables, as well as an 
interdependence expressed by the relevance of the estimators obtained in the simultaneous equations model. 
Thus, each of the attributes – ownership concentration, insider ownership and profitability – is a function of the 
others. 
 
JEL Classification: G32. 
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1. Introduction 
Agency theory has contributed to the understanding of the problems underlying the conflict within organizations. 
From the conflicts of interest that can be generated between the various stakeholders, the literature has given 
greater attention to: i) conflicts between owners and managers/directors, ii) conflicts of interest between owners 
and the company’s creditors; (Jensen et al., 1976), and iii) conflict between majority and minority owners, 
leading to problems of expropriation (Shleifer et al., 1986). 
As it is difficult to reach a consensus on the best way to assess ownership structure and the literature suggests 
different ways to quantify it, we propose ownership concentration and insider ownership as characteristics that 
identify it best, since these are simple and intuitive variables, less prone to measurement error and not subject to 
the problems of weighting. 
Ownership concentration affects the relationship of the company with other stakeholders, investment 
opportunities, company growth and consequently performance. Dispersed ownership can lead to communication 
and coordination problems as a result of the diversity of owners and the separation of ownership and control. 
Meanwhile, supervision of the managers/directors by the owners intends to prevent unsuitable management 
practices or behaviours which are inconsistent with what must be the main objective of the principal 
(maximizing value for the owner), limiting management’s immunity, known as “entrenchment” in the literature. 
Supervision, however, has costs and provides benefits to all of the owners in proportion to their holdings, so that 
few are interested in doing it. This phenomenon leads to “free-riding” problems and reduced performance. With 
a small number of owners the communication and coordination problems decrease as interests are more aligned, 
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which can lead to greater oversight (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) or to less expropriation of minority shareholders 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
In the scenario of apparent conflict, our main aim is to analyze the relationship between ownership structure 
(concentration and insider ownership) and operating profitability on assets (ROA) using panel data. In addition, 
we intend to study whether the ROA and the ownership concentration on the one hand, and insider ownership 
 ROA on the other hand, establish reciprocal relationships and to assess their interdependence using a system of 
simultaneous equations.  
Results show that the ownership concentration display a U-shaped relationship with profitability in line with 
what Hu et al. (2010) obtained for Japanese family businesses. When compared with those obtained in similar 
studies in the Spanish business environment, they suggest an inverse relationship to that obtained by Miguel et 
al. (2004) for listed companies and confirm the relationship formulated but not validated by Arosa et al. (2010) 
for unlisted companies. The effects of entrenchment and convergence of interests are also confirmed in the 
relationship established between the insider ownership and profitability. 
This paper is organized as follows. In addition to this introduction, it is comprised of four sections. The second 
section is devoted to a survey of the relevant literature on this topic. The third focuses on the hypotheses, the 
sample, data, variables and methodology. The results are presented and discussed in the fourth section. Finally, 
the fifth section presents the key findings and limitations of this study and to suggest avenues for future work.  
 
2. Survey of the Literature 
The relationship between the ownership concentration, insider ownership and performance in companies has 
been an important and controversial issue in corporate governance. Agency theory states that the ownership 
structure is an important determinant of performance – causality of property for performance. However, studies 
such as those by Pedersen and Thomsen (2001) and Holderness (2003) argue that causality may be in the 
opposite direction under some circumstances – causality of performance for ownership structure. Although the 
impact of ownership structure on performance has been explored in the literature (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 
2003; Miguel, et al., 2004), studies on the effect of performance feedback on ownership structure, are scarce and 
have been limited to the North American reality (e.g., Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985).  
Research conducted on U.S. firms is based on a highly dispersed ownership, whereby it may have limited 
applicability (Cho, 1998 and Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). In fact, continental countries are characterized by a 
concentrated ownership and strategically oriented towards stable relationships. These ensure sustainable 
development rather than favouring performance or control rights over the company. The question is then raised: 
i) if the ownership held by the main owners and by managers/directors plays an important role in determining 
corporate profitability, and ii) do the owners and the managers/directors change their level of ownership 
according to the company's profitability.  
Ownership concentration is one of the main mechanisms of corporate governance which influences agency costs 
(Jensene Meckling, 1976). Based on this premise, the effect of ownership concentration on performance has 
been widely documented in the literature with particular attention to companies in the United States and the 
United Kingdom.  
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Since dispersion creates free riding problems and makes it difficult to supervise, a positive relationship is 
expected between ownership concentration and corporate performance. Consistent with this hypothesis 
supervision, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) refer to the important role played by large owners, and how the stock 
price rises as the percentage of shares held by them increases. Grossman and Hart (1986) argue that owners with 
a high stake in the company show greater willingness to play an active role in decisions as they can internalize 
the benefits of their monitoring effort. The method used by large owners to oversee the 
management/administration is a result of informal agreements drawn up amongst themselves (Sheifer and 
Vishny, 1997). Nevertheless, ownership concentration can lead to conflicts between controlling and minority 
owners leading to worse performance, as advocated by expropriation hypothesis. The divergences induce a 
perverse widespread problem in that the controllers expropriate wealth from minority owners. Small investors 
fear being expropriated through inefficient investments yielding higher costs for the company (La Porta, et al., 
1999). Sheifer and Vishny (1997) argue that in some countries, the agency costs resulting from the conflict of 
interest between controlling and minority owners are much more significant than those resulting from the 
separation of ownership and management (administration). Thus, high levels of ownership can generate costs, 
particularly when the majority owners do not redistribute wealth equitably with minority owners, because their 
interests do not always coincide. 
Several authors analyze the relationship between ownership concentration and performance to determine the 
existence of an optimal structure. For example, in a study conducted on 470 companies listed in the UK, Leech 
and Leahy (1991) document an inverse linear relationship between ownership concentration and performance. 
The same relationship was observed by Mudambi and Nicosia (1998) and Lehmann and Weigand (2000) for a 
sample of British and German companies, respectively.  
Meanwhile, a linear and positive relationship between ownership concentration and performance is validated for 
a group of U.S. (e.g., Hill and Snell, 1988 and Agrawall and Mandelker, 1990), Japanese (e.g., Kaplan and 
Minton, 1994 and Gedajilovic and Shapiro, 2002) and German (e.g., Schmidt and Gorton, 2000) companies. 
Gedajilovic and Shapiro (2002) reported that investors in the Japanese institutional context, are rather 
unprotected by the legal system and ownership is highly concentrated. Thus, minority owners, unlike what 
happens in other countries, are not expropriated since banks play an important role in corporate control. This 
leads to a convergence of interests between different owners and managers/directors. 
Yet, when the dominant owners have enough power to control, they can maximize personal wealth at the 
expense of the company’s value, leading to a conflict of interests between the majority and minority owner. In 
this sense, while analyzing listed Spanish Miguel et al. (2004) companies realize there is a nonlinear relationship. 
They conclude that the market value of companies increases until ownership concentration reaches 87 percent as 
a result of the effect of supervision, but beyond this point minority owners may be expropriated. This leads to a 
decrease in the value of the company. Thus, an inverted U-shaped relationship is found. In order to explain the 
results obtained, the work refers to a set of institutional features of the Spanish corporate governance system 
which differentiates it from previous studies, including: the level of ownership concentration, the effectiveness 
of boards of directors, the development of the capital market, the monitoring activity of the market over business 
activity and the legal protection of investors. Other authors (e.g., Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 2002 and Anderson 
and Reb, 2003) also provide support for a nonlinear relationship between ownership concentration and 
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performance, diverging, however, as to the value from which the effect of supervision replaces that of 
expropriation. This difference stems from different corporate governance systems, the legal protection of 
investors, the development of capital markets, the role of the market in corporate control, the industrial sector, 
among others (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, La Porta et al. , 1998.) 
In a more recent study of unlisted Spanish SMEs, Arosa et al. (2010) report that no relationship was identified 
between ownership concentration and performance. No evidence was found to corroborate the expropriation and 
supervision hypothesis for the companies analyzed. That is, the results obtained by Miguel et al. (2004), is based 
listed Spanish companies is uncorroborated for unlisted companies. In this case, the level of ownership 
concentration has no direct influence on the behaviour of the owners. This may be related to the status of 
unlisted companies their ownership concentration. Nevertheless, when dividing the sample depending on the 
nature of the ownership, the results suggest that the relationship between ownership concentration and 
performance differs depending on the generation which generates/manages the enterprise. In first-generation 
family businesses, a positive relationship between ownership concentration and performance is found for low 
levels of control rights, so that the supervision hypothesis prevails; a negative relationship is found for high 
levels of control rights, as expected by the expropriation hypothesis. 
In the context of Japanese manufacturing enterprises, Hu and Izumida (2008) conducted a study where they 
analyze the causal relationship between ownership concentration and performance. The results suggest a U-
shaped relationship between ownership concentration and performance, in line with the expropriation effect 
predominant in low levels of ownership and the supervision effect for intermediate levels of ownership, 
indicating that both dispersed ownership and high ownership concentration are associated with improved 
performance. On the other hand, they showed an insignificant effect of performance on ownership concentration, 
supported by the fact that capital markets have low liquidity, which prevents larger owners from changing their 
portfolios depending on performance. Considering the results, they conclude that ownership concentration is not 
determined by performance in illiquid markets, where it is difficult to transact and change ownership in response 
to changes in circumstances. 
In addition to ownership concentration, the company’s performance can be influenced the decisions of the 
managers/directors and the way they use company resources to maximize personal wealth at the expense of 
business results (Oswald and Jahera, 1991; Pegels et al., 2000). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the 
natural tendency of managers/directors is to affect the company's resources for their own interests, which may 
lead to conflicts with other stakeholders. As insider ownership increases, interests converge and thus conflicts 
between managers/directors and owners tend to be resolved (Miguel, et al., 2004). This convergence of interests 
hypothesis suggests that the company increases its value when the level of insider ownership rises. Nevertheless, 
high levels of insider ownership can generate costs as Fama and Jensen (1983) point out. When the 
manager/director owns a substantial fraction of the company’s capital, this gives him voting power and/or 
significant influence. This, in turn, may not comply with the objectives of maximizing value, without 
jeopardizing their employment and therefore their salary (Miguel et al., 2004).   
Since one of the objectives pursued by governance mechanisms is to prevent managers/directors from taking 
inadequate measures or from performing in a manner that is inconsistent with maximizing value to the owner, a 
phenomenon of management immunity can sometimes develop. This is known in the literature as 
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“entrenchment” (Costa, 1998). According to Berger et al. (1997), entrenchment reflects the situation in which 
managers/directors are immune to the discipline imposed by a wide range of control mechanisms. The level of 
the managers/directors’ “entrenchment” may be enhanced by several factors, particularly the weight of 
ownership held and voting power in decision-making (Demsetz, 1983; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Bebchuk et al. 
2009). 
Opposing effects of insider ownership on firm value, alignment of interests and entrenchment, suggest a 
nonlinear relationship between insider ownership and company performance. For low levels of insider 
ownership, there is a convergence of interests, agency costs decline and performance improves. In intermediate 
levels of insider ownership convergence costs (coincidence of ideas about how to run the business) outweigh 
gains and interest between managers and other owners may differ. In order to maximize their own interest 
managers/directors can divert results and other company assets under their control, enjoy higher remuneration, 
place unqualified relatives in management positions, or become irreplaceable (La Porta, et al. 2000; Gomez-
Mejia, et al. 2001). Managers/directors can also choose to invest in projects that would be rejected when the rate 
of return required by the owners is considered, but which would meet their own expectations (Lisboa, 2007). For 
higher levels of insider ownership performance increases again, as the owner/manager/director of the company 
has additional incentives in valuing share price (Loderer and Martin, 1997). A review of relevant literature 
(Mudambi and Nicosia, 1998; Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 2002; Kumar, 2004; Miguel, et al., 2004) suggests that 
the relationship between insider ownership and performance has two inflection points; however, studies are not 
unanimous as to the percentage at which the inflection occurs and diverge in the models and variables used. 
Some studies use accounting data (e.g., Kumar, 2004) or market data (e.g., Michael, et al. 2004), others use a 
small number (e.g., Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 2002) or a significant number (e.g., Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001) 
of control variables. 
Most studies indicate that ownership concentration and insider ownership have a positive impact on 
performance. Nevertheless, Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) question this causal relationship, 
indicating that ownership concentration should be thought of as endogenous, a consequence of the decisions of 
maximizing results for owners. Cho (1998), Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) 
suggest that the variables of ownership are determined in equilibrium, endogenously. The positive or negative 
causal effect of performance on ownership is also reported by Pedersen and Thomsen (2001) and Holdeerness, 
(2003). Expecting better performance, the owners who are controllers increase their holdings in order to have 
greater control and obtain a higher income, assuming good performance persists, thereby constituting an 
indicator of the positive effect of performance on ownership concentration (Hu and Izumida, 2008). Conversely, 
if the value of the company is too high in relation to expectations generated and participation is subject to high 
risks, the owners are driven to sell part of their holdings. In this situation there is a negative effect of 
performance on concentration (Hu and Izumida, 2008). However, Zhou (2001) finds that ownership 
concentration has remained stable over the years, leading him to conclude that significant costs of adaptation and 
coordination make adjustments of ownership concentration more difficult. 
The relationship between performance and insider ownership can be seen, within the context of agency theory, 
as one of the most relevant contributions to reduce agency problems between different stakeholders (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Indeed, when the manager/director has no 
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holding, he may not have sufficient incentives to develop creative activities (often required to maximize the 
company’s value) such as, seeking innovative investment projects or incorporating new production technologies, 
leading to myopic policies (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The manager/director’s stake in the capital can be a tool 
which will make him be more efficient or lead others to be so. Short-term incentives (salary) can be linked to 
long-term incentives (depending on results) translated by shares in the company, which serve as incentives or 
complementary compensatory systems to enhance the manager/director’s preference for long-term results (Gaver 
and Gaver, 1993). Jensen (1993) proposes a combination of incentives to increase shareholder value. Thus, the 
manager/director is rewarded by increasing their wealth and differences between managers/directors and owners 
are reduced (Mehran, 1995). Thus, managers/directors may receive stock or stock options. Both have similar 
effects and, therefore, perform a substitute effect. Nevertheless, stock options reward manager/director but do 
not penalize them the same way as diminishing shareholder wealth. This leads them to assume greater risk when 
they hold options.  
Within the context of family firms, ownership concentration often leads to the controlling shareholder/partner to 
perform activities designed to extract private benefits (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, La Porta et al., 2000) by which 
profitability as a mechanism to induce greater participation by managers/directors in the company's capital and 
convergence of interests becomes less relevance. In this sense, some studies (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Demsetz, 1983) suggest that controlling family shareholders/partners tend to defend their own interests, treating 
the company as a tool to provide employment to the family or as a way to obtain financing thereby limiting the 
top positions to family members. 
 
 
3. Hypotheses, sample, data and variables, methodology  
 
3.1. Hypotheses 
The object of study in the literature has been large firms with dispersed capital. The question, however, of 
assessing whether the results remain valid for small and family-oriented businesses has come up. To begin with, 
family owners, unlike the others, are more interested in the long term survival of the company. Agency problems 
seem less important in the context of these companies because the controlling owners already have enough 
incentives that give them power and information to control top managers/directors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Nevertheless, high levels of ownership concentration can trigger other problems and other costs in the context of 
corporate governance. The free-rider and entrenchment problems of the family members can override or even 
exceed the benefits of the agency agreement between owners and managers/directors (Dinoe Buchholtz, 2001; 
Chua, et al., 2003). Conversely, the long term presence of family members in the company can increase the 
quality of results (Wang, 2006) and facilitate the company’s technological knowledge, thus improving 
performance (Martikainen, et al., 2009). 
On the other hand, concern for reputation and the intention of preserving the family name are likely to involve a 
greater commitment on the part of owners, producing positive economic impacts. Family ties and reputation may 
limit the manager/director’s acting for his own benefit when their family members manage the company (Denis, 
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1994). The family reputation may also foster long-term relationships, leading, for example, to a reduction of 
conflict of interests between owners and creditors and a lower cost of financing (Anderson and Reeb, 2003).  
Problems arising from the separation of ownership and control are reduced in first generation family businesses 
because the same person is responsible for the management/administration, for investment decisions and 
supervision (Schulze et al., 2001). Agency costs can be reduced by completely eliminating separation of 
ownership and control. In these cases, the interests of the principal and the agent are aligned, so that the 
management/administration will not expropriate the wealth of the owners (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2006). 
When the company incorporates later generations, priorities are altered; ownership is shared by a growing 
number of members and conflicts can arise if interests are not aligned, and the relationships between the various 
participants are influenced by economic and personal preferences (Chrisman, et al. 2005; Sharmaa, et al. 2007). 
Over time the economic incentive to maximize personal utility can induce the controlling owner to confuse 
family objectives (interests) with the business objectives (Schulze et al., 2002). According to Anderson and Reeb 
(2003), the founding owner grants the company valuable capabilities, unlike his successors who intervene less 
towards productivity and efficiency. This argument is consistent with empirical evidence (Villalonga and Amit, 
2006; Baraontini and Caprio, 2006; Pindado, et al., 2008) which testifies that firms managed by their founder 
perform better than others.  
Based on the theoretical references developed in the previous section we have formulated the following 
hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a nonlinear relationship between ownership concentration and the company’s operating 
profitability, which first increases and then decreases. 
ititittiit CCROAROA    21412)1(1110                            Model 1 
where ROA and C represent operational profitability and ownership concentration, respectively. The dependent 
variable in Model 1 is profitability. The persistence of results – the company that operates well can continue to 
do so (Goddard and Wilson, 1999) – leads the profitability of the previous year to be positively associated with 
that of the current year. The literature review states that the effect of supervision and expropriation may occur 
simultaneously, suggesting a non-linear effect. The main advantage of the linear quadratic regression model is 
the presence of an inflection point, which takes in a change in the slope, the earliest symptom of the prevalence 
of the supervision and expropriation hypotheses. 
The aim is also to investigate empirically if age is a potentiating factor of the effect of ownership concentration 
on profitability, reflected in the fact that it reduces or increases the magnitude and direction of this effect. The 
importance of considering this effect has already been suggested by Morck et al. (2000). The classification of 
companies based on age is associated with two recent problems in research: i) the decision of succession within 
the family business and ii) the generation of the family that exercises domination. Bennedsen et al. (2006) report 
a decline in corporate performance with the succession of family managers/directors. They also reveal that 
companies where the founder is in charge of management/administration show better performance in relation to 
others (Villalongaa and Amit, 2006).  
Therefore, we formulate the second hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 2: The relationship between ownership concentration and operating profitability is stronger in young 
companies than in ‘mature’ ones. 
To test this hypothesis in Model 1 a dummy variable JM is introduced. It takes the value “one” if the company is 
young and zero in all other cases and a model is formulated in which the existence iterative effects between 
ownership concentration and this dummy is admitted. For purposes of classification as “young” and “mature,” 
we felt that a company is “young” when its age is below the sample mean in line with (Pindado, et. Al, 2008). 
ititititittiit CJMCJMROAROA    225242322)1(2120 )()(   Model 2 
Regarding insider ownership   the following hypothesis is formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 3: A company’s profitability increases with insider ownership for low and high levels (as a result of 
the effect of convergence of interest) and decreases for intermediate levels (as a result of the effect the 
managers/directors’ entrenchment). 
In order to test this hypothesis, a model that postulates a cubic relationship between ownership and internal 
operational profitability was formulated.  
itititittiit PIPIPIROAROA    33423332)1(3130         Model 3 
where PI, PI2,PI3, is the percentage of equity held by managers/directors, its square and its cube, respectively. 
 
A fourth hypothesis addresses the effect of profitability on ownership concentration 
 
Hypothesis 4: The company’s profitability has a positive impact on ownership concentration which is an 
incentive for the owner to exert greater control. 
 
To test this hypothesis, the model is as follows:  
 
ittiittiit ROAROACC    )1(4342)1(4140               Model 4 
 
In opposition to the causality advocated in Hypothesis 1, performance has been recognized to have an inverted 
relationship on ownership concentration in the literature (e.g., Pedersen and Thomsen, 2001 and Holderness, 
2003). Companies with good profitability are a strong incentive for concentrating ownership, resulting in greater 
control and/or a higher volume of rights on the assumption that it will persist, indicating a positive effect. 
Regarding what conditions insider ownership, corporate performance is a strong incentive for greater 
involvement of the manager/director in the company’s equity. 
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Hypothesis 5: The company’s profitability has a positive impact on insider ownership constituting an incentive 
to practice efficient management/administration and to reduce conflicts between owners and 
managers/directors. 
 
To test this hypothesis, the following model was estimated: 
 
ittiittiit ROAROAPIPI    )1(5352)1(5150              Model 5  
As the literature review points out, there are a growing number of authors who formulate interdependent 
relationships between profitability, concentration of ownership and internal property whereby from an 
econometric point of view it is necessary to formulate a system of simultaneous equations. 
 
Hypothesis 6: The company’s profitability, the ownership concentration and insider ownership establish an 
interdependent relationship amongst themselves. 
 
To test this interdependent relationship between performance, ownership concentration and insider ownership 
the following model of simultaneous equations is also estimated: 
 
ە
ۖۖ
ۖ
۔
ۖۖ
ۖ
ۓܴܱܣ it ൌ ߚ଺ଵ଴ ൅ ߚ଺ଵଵܥ it ൅ ߚ଺ଵଶܲܫ it ൅ ߝ it
ܥ it ൌ ߚ଺ଶ଴ ൅ ߚ଺ଶଵܴܱܣ it ൅ ߚ଺ଶଶܲܫ it ൅ ߝ it
ܲܫ it ൌ ߚ଺ଷ଴ ൅ ߚ଺ଷଵܴܱܣ it ൅ ߚ଺ଷଶܥ it ൅ ߝ it
                                                                           Model 6 
 
3.2. Sample, data and variables 
The main source of information was SABI (Iberian Balance Sheet Analysis System, version 123 – November 
2009) and the sample was selected as follows: i) companies that did not have accounting information for the 
period under review were eliminated from the database; ii) only those which satisfied the conditions set by the 
Bank of Portugal in their analyses (Total Assets, Equity, Positive Turnover and Gross Value Added (GVA)) 
were included; iii) only companies that presented economic viability shown by a positive operating profitability 
were retained iv) companies that met the conditions of SMEs under Decree-Law no. 372/20071; v) neither the 
                                                 
1 This Decree-Law defines micro, small and medium enterprises. The category of micro, small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) is made up of enterprises which employ fewer than 250 people and whose annual turnover does not exceed €50 
million or whose annual balance sheet total does not exceed € 43 million. A small business is defined as an enterprise 
which employs fewer than 50 people and whose annual turnover or annual balance sheet total does not exceed €10 million. 
A micro enterprise is defined as employing fewer than 10 people and whose annual turnover does not exceed €2 million. 
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“Public Administration, Defense and Social Security” nor the “Financial and Insurance Activity” sectors were 
considered for lack of data; and finally vi) only those companies for which information regarding equity 
distribution was available were retained. Note that the need to classify companies according to their size, given 
the limited number of which had a record of their number of employees for the period 2003 to 2005, has led us to 
adopt their number of employees in 2006 for this period. Given these constraints, the sample consists of 4163 
companies.  
The period time considered, 2003/08, allows two of the methodology’s limitations to be controlled for: 
unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity. Thus, information for a period of at least four consecutive years by 
the company becomes necessary to be able to test the absence of second order serial correlation as mentioned by 
Arellano and Bond (1991), one of the assumptions of the estimation method adopted (GMM).  
To measure each attribute, we take into account the indicators used by other authors from the accounting 
information given the absence of market values for the population under study (SMEs). The use of profitability 
indicators as an expression of corporate performance is supported in many empirical studies, highlighting 
economic profitability (ROA), expressed in the asset’s capacity to generate results (e.g., Pedersen and Thomsen, 
2001 and Wiwattanakantang, 2001). 
Ownership structure as a mechanism of internal control is measured by ownership concentration and insider 
ownership. Ownership concentration (C) indicates the percentage of equity held by the two largest owners 
(Kuznetsov Muravyev, 2001) and insider ownership (IP) the part of the equity held by the managing 
bodies/directors (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Admit, 2006). The variables used in the models are 
defined in Table 1 and the descriptive statistics in Table 2. 
 (Insert Tables 1 and 2) 
 
We also consider a company young when its age is below the mean of the companies in the sample, yielding a 
dummy variable (JM) which is equal to one if the company is young, and zero otherwise (Pindado et. al, 2008). 
As for the nature of the ownership, it is a family company if the main partner/shareholder is an individual or 
family with at least 50% of the equity (Anderson and Reeb, 2003, Wang, 2006). The business dimension is 
evaluated by a set of variables to classify firms according to a multicriteria vector that combines the number of 
employees, turnover and total assets. Decree-Law No. 372/2007 is adopted as a basis, gathering together micro, 
small and average enterprises. Table 3 presents the segmentation criteria of the sample.  
(Insert Table 3) 
 
3.1. Methodology 
The methodology uses panel data to estimate the models formulated. This choice is motivated by the relevance 
of two important issues in the study of the impact of ownership concentration and insider ownership on 
operational profitability: i) unobserved heterogeneity (corporate characteristics that influence profitability are 
difficult to measure or obtain) and ii) problems of individual endogeneity. Unobserved heterogeneity was 
controlled the through the individual effect i,- corporate specificities giving rise to specific behaviour, and the 
 12
effect of time, dt. What is considered the error term in the model, ߥ௜௧ is divided into three distinct components: 
the first is the individual effect i, the second dt the time effect and the third μ,it random disturbance. Moreover, 
the potential endogeneity of ownership concentration and insider ownership may condition the relationship with 
profitability, so that instrumental variables are used and the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).  
Consider the following generic specification for a data panel model refering to the sectional unit i at moment t 
௜ܻ௧ ൌ β଴୧୲ ൅ ∑ ߚ௞௜௧ ௜ܺ௧ ൅௞௜ୀଵ ߥ௜௧     i = 1,…N   t = 1,….T 
where: 
௜ܻ௧ - observed value of the dependent variable for individual i at moment t 
β଴୧୲- independent regression term for individual i at moment t 
ߚ௞௜௧- regression coefficient of the K variable for individual i at moment t 
௜ܺ௧-  observed value of explanatory variable K for individual i at moment t 
ߥ௜௧- residual term (the regression error) for individual i at moment t, equal to i + dt + μit     
N -  number of sectional units (individuals) 
T-  number of time periods 
NxT- number of observations 
 
Decomposition of the error term allows the panel data methodology to consider that the effect is not observed, i 
is correlated with the explanatory variables. Since i is constant over time, data over two consecutive periods can 
be distinguished, giving rise to a new equation, known as the first-difference equation, where i is not found (it 
was removed by differentiation). The inclusion of lagged values for the explanatory variables gives rise to 
endogeneity, reflected in the fact that it is correlated with the error term, so that the estimators obtained by the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method of are biased and inconsistent. Thus, the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) is used in estimating our models, which allows us to control endogeneity using instruments (variables 
that satisfy two conditions: i) not being correlated with ߥ௜௧, i.e. Cov ( ܼ௜௧ , ߥ௜௧) = 0 and ii) they are correlated with 
௜ܺ௧, i.e. Cov (ܼ௜௧ ,	 ௜ܺ௧) ≠ 0. 
Under the GMM, the best known test is the over-identification test, or J test proposed by Hansen, which allows 
the quality of the instruments to be measured. The clearest way to test the specification of a model is to check if 
the values of all the conditions of the sample moments are close to zero or not, since the GMM only requires 
their k linear combinations to be. The J statistic has an asymptotic distribution of chi-square with s-k degrees of 
freedom. 
In models with time series the presence of a positive correlation between adjacent errors is often found, 
symbolically expressed by E(εi, εj) ≠ 0i ≠ j.  One of the situations in which the regressors are not strictly 
exogenous occurs when the model contains a lagging dependent variable: ௜ܻ௧ and μit are correlated. To test the 
autocorrelation of the error term we use the Arellano and Bond statistic for autocorrelation under the null 
hypothesis of zero serial correlation. Negative serial correlation in the first order differences is expected, 
resulting from the relationship between Δεi,t and Δεi,t-1 through the εi, t-1 term, so that a serial correlation of 
order r with r = 2, ..., T should be sought. 
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The need to estimate the mutual relations between profitability, ownership concentration and insider ownership 
requires a simultaneous equations model to be adopted, with a number of equations equal to the endogenous 
variables. The existing statistical programs (e.g., STATA) do not include routines for estimating systems of 
simultaneous equations with panel data, considering them cross-section data, leading to inefficient estimates. 
 
4. Results 
In this section we present the results of the proposed models in order to test the hypotheses. The estimates for the 
parameters in each model were obtained through the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). This was 
followed up with tests to assess their quality. In all of the models, the Arellano and Bond test reveals no 
correlation between the errors, with Hansen’s test validating the instruments used, so that the methodology used 
is found to be suitable. 
4.1. Ownership Concentration and Corporate Profitability 
Estimation results of the model first formulated using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), are found in 
Table 4 column I, when considering the totality of the sample companies. The values obtained suggest that 
ownership concentration has a nonlinear impact on corporate profitability, expressed in the significance of 
regression coefficients. In particular, the coefficient of the ownership concentration variable is negative (B1 <0) 
and its square is positive (B2> 0), which represents a quadratic U-shaped relationship. This means that the 
expropriation hypothesis prevails for low levels of control rights and the supervision hypothesis for high levels. 
The results have revealed themselves significant, unlike what happened in Arosa et al. (2010) and Westhead and 
Howorth (2006), and establish a contrary relationship to that obtained by Miguel et al. (2004) for Spanish listed 
companies. Nevertheless, they are in consonance with the findings of Hu and Izumida (2008) for small family 
businesses in Japan. The negative effect of ownership concentration on profitability for low levels of 
concentration suggests that two potential costs prevail. On the one hand, there is an incentive for the owner to 
take actions that increase their personal utility, reducing corporate performance (Anderson and Reeb, 2003), 
which may be associated with less efficient investment decisions (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003). On the other 
hand, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2001) suggest that as the concentration of family ownership increases there is an 
influence of family control over managers/directors, which can lead to greater entrenchment. The inversion of 
the concavity of the quadratic relationship, over that obtained in other studies focusing on large enterprises, may 
be related to the fact that the latter possess external control systems, professional management and more 
dispersed ownership where the holders of the equity purchase and sell shares in high liquidity securities markets. 
In listed companies, ownership loses its relevance as a mechanism of supervision, as this is ensured by external 
(market) forces. Conversely, in small businesses internal control systems and more concentrated ownership 
prevail and less efficiency of securities markets is felt. The ownership structure thus plays an important role in 
disciplining managers/directors and significant determines performance for lack of effective external control.  
A quadratic relationship proposed in model 1 shows only one inflection point that can be determined by deriving 
the function in relation to ownership concentration. Calculating the first derivative and making it equal to zero, 
we obtain the variable value where the function reaches an extreme. Since the coefficient of the term of higher 
degree is positive, we can say that the function has a minimum at C1= - (B1/2B2), which for this sample is 
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68.69%. The fact that the coefficient B2 presents a very low value indicates that the parabola has a “very open” 
U-shape. These values allow us to conclude that there is a quadratic relationship between ownership 
concentration and profitability as advocated by Hypothesis 1. Nevertheless, concavity is inverted. 
Columns II, III and IV of Table 4 show the results of the estimation of model 1, for the sample segmented by 
size according to the criteria defined in Table 3. The results obtained when considering all firms in the sample 
remain valid for the subsamples consisting of micro, small and medium enterprises. Nevertheless, the break 
point, where the expropriation effect gives rise to the supervision effect, changes. It appears that micro and small 
enterprises have a value of 80.47% and 71.51%, respectively, placing them above the value obtained for the total 
sample firms. For medium-sized companies the inflection point is found at lower levels, 57.04%. The results 
indicate that as the company increases in size, the supervision effect prevails from lower levels of ownership 
concentration. Thus, the estimates suggest that larger firms are subject to mechanisms of higher scrutiny. 
In columns V and VI of Table 4, we consider the segmenting criterion firm age, according to the criterion found 
in Table 3. The model parameters remain significant as the conclusions remain valid for all firms in the sample. 
Nevertheless, the supervision effect of the “mature” companies replaces the expropriation effect at lower levels 
of ownership concentration than obtained for the total sample, with the value of 67.18%. “Young” firms need to 
achieve a concentration of 74.19% for the supervision effect to prevail. Adopting the nature of ownership 
(family/non-family) as a segmenting criterion, as recommended in Table 3, the significance of ownership 
concentration on profitability is only validated for family businesses. The sign of its coefficients remain in 
accordance with the values expressed in columns VII and VIII of Table 4. 
Finally, columns IX, X, XI and XII of Table 4 show the estimation of model 1 intersecting the first two 
segmenting criteria above. The level of significance for the coefficients obtained leads us to assert that the 
relationship between ownership concentration and profitability is relevant in young family firms. These results 
suggest that their owners are more motivated to expropriate businesses. It is important to highlight the fact that 
the break point presents the highest value within the estimations made, reaching 80.55%.  
We can say that in family businesses ownership concentration becomes significant with regards to profitability, 
largely attributable young family firms. 
 (Insert Table 4) 
 
4.2. The moderating effect of age 
The results of the second model formulated are presented in Table 5, showing the moderating effect of age on 
the relationship established in the previous model. Analysis of the regression coefficients associated with Cit  JMi  
and C2it  JMi allows us to conclude that there is a significant interaction between ownership concentration and age 
(i.e., the relationship between ownership concentration and profitability is moderated by age). The values 
suggest that age influences and enhances the relationship established in the previous model, in line with previous 
empirical results (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003 and Baronitini and Caprio, 2006). All of the model’s estimated 
coefficients are significant, with the previous references remaining valid, allowing Hypothesis 2 to be validated. 
 (Insert Table 5) 
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4.3 Insider ownership and corporate profitability  
Estimation results of the model that establishes a link between profitability and insider ownership (model 3) are 
summarized in Table 6. The coefficients of the columns I and II are all shown to be meaningful, validating a 
quadratic relationship between insider ownership and profitability. It is not possible, however, to support the 
cubic specification of the model with the values obtained when this specification is considered (see column III). 
The coefficients for PI and PI2, respectively negative and positive, constitute an entrenchment effect and 
convergence of interests. For insider ownership values up to 79.10%, profitability decreases, suggesting that 
insiders are less interested in the welfare of the other owners and that their greater security is more likely to 
entrench them. For higher values, the increases in insider ownership are translated into increased profitability, 
where the added incentives that managers/directors have to maximize the value can contribute to their increased 
participation. In a study conducted on listed Spanish firms subject to the scrutiny of the market, Miguel et al. 
(2004) validate a cubic relationship between these variables. The results do not allow the cubic specification 
formulated in Hypothesis 3 to be validated; however, the coefficients of the variables PI and PI2 support a 
quadratic relationship between insider ownership and profitability. 
 (Insert Table 6) 
 
4.4. Profitability and ownership concentration 
Table 7 presents the estimation results of model 4. Analysis of these results shows a causal relationship between 
the values of profitability with one period lag and ownership concentration. The values of the previous period, 
however, are not statistically significant on concentration. The value of the profitability coefficient is positive 
and significant validating not only the relationship of reciprocity, but also the determinant role it has on 
ownership concentration. The results reveal the importance of profitability, namely in the previous period, on 
ownership concentration, as suggested by Hypothesis 4, which is consistent with previous empirical evidence 
(Thomsen et al., 2006).  
 (Insert Table 7) 
 
4.5. Profitability and insider ownership 
The estimation results of model 5, which establishes a relationship between profitability and insider ownership, 
are found in Table 8. The coefficients of profitability (current and lagging by one period) are statistically 
significant, with a negative relationship with the insider ownership. The insider ownership held in the previous 
period is also a determinant of insider ownership at the current time. The inverse relationship between 
profitability and insider ownership suggests that, as a result of expropriation practices performed by the 
controlling owner and by allocating managerial/directorial positions to people appointed by him, profitability is 
not a sufficient “incentive” to induce greater participation by managers/directors in corporate ownership. The 
absence of a clear distinction between individual and corporate property, the propensity to give up, in the short 
run, income (safeguarding the business for future generations) and reduced professionalism of the 
management/administration can contribute to profitability not being considered an sufficiently relevant incentive 
for the participation of managers/directors in the ownership (Anderson and Reeb, 2003, Wang, 2006; Arosa, et 
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al., 2010). The estimation results of the model and the negative coefficients of the ROAit and ROAi(t-1) support 
Hypothesis 5, but with an opposite impact (negative) to what was formulated. 
 (Insert Table 8) 
 
4.6. Simultaneous effects: operational profitability, ownership concentration and insider ownership. 
As a prior study to the analysis of the simultaneity between profitability, ownership concentration and insider 
ownership,  an endogeneity diagnostic is carried out by the ordinary least squares method. Table 9 provides the 
results obtained in the estimation of each equation, allowing endogeneity between the variables to be assured 
since all the coefficients are statistically significant. 
  (Insert Table 9) 
 
The estimation results of model 6 estimation, obtained by the three-step least squares (3SLS) method are shown 
in Table 10. Firstly, I shall point out two aspects: i) the statistical relevance of all the coefficients and, ii) the 
stability of the relationship among variables expressed in maintaining the sign of the coefficients. Ownership 
concentration and profitability establish a direct relationship between themselves (equation I) that remains 
between profitability and ownership concentration (equation II). Insider ownership conditions profitability 
negatively (equation I) and this, in turn, conditions insider ownership (equation III), without changing the 
direction of the relationship. Regarding insider ownership and ownership concentration, they maintain a direct 
relationship between themselves as shown by equations II and III. 
(Insert Table 10) 
 
4.7. Robustness analysis 
The models proposed require a methodology that makes use of the instrumental variables as a mechanism to 
control the possible endogeneity of the explanatory variables. The best choice is a GMM estimator because it 
incorporates all of the others (Ogaki, 1993). Furthermore, GMM is particularly suitable for this study given the 
dynamic nature of the variables. Previous studies show that in the context of dynamic models, various estimation 
techniques generate biased estimators. Specifically, the ordinary least squares method (OLS) yields an 
overestimation of the parameters by virtue of the presence of individual endogeneity (Hsaio, 1986). Moreover, 
the estimators with centred variables (Wihin-groups) give rise to default values (Nickell, 1981). More recently, 
Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999) show that the first difference GMM estimators (First diferrence GMM) are 
subject to a problem of weak instruments. As a result Blundell and Bond (1998) propose the system GMM 
(System GMM) in the context of dynamic models. 
To validate that the System GMM is the best suited to our study, we compared the results obtained (Equation 1) 
with this methodology with other estimation techniques. 
The results obtained are shown in Table 11. The lag ROA coefficient, using the reference estimation method 
(System GMM), is 0.36560 (column IV). As Hsaio (1986) suggests, the coefficient obtained by the OLS 
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estimator, 0.64435 (column I) has a higher value. The value of the coefficient, estimated by Within-Groups, 
0.13015, is clearly inferior. Contrary to the OLS and the Within-groups, it is not possible to establish any 
specific relationship between the first difference GMM and the System GMM. As shown in Table 11 (Column 
III), the yield coefficient of the offset is 0.15562, smaller than the coefficient obtained by the System GMM 
(0.36560).  
Given the values obtained and according to the authors indicated, we can conclude that System GMM is the 
method which best serves the purposes of our work. Thus, all of the models were estimated using the System 
GMM.  
The methodology allows the endogeneity of the variables in the model to be controlled, with the inclusion of lags 
of the second and third period, lags (2 3), as instruments in the equations in differences and with only one lag in 
the equations for levels, as suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998).  
Tests were carried out to assess the quality of the specification models. Through Hansen’s J overidentification 
statistic, the selected instruments were validated, and the AR (2) and AR (3) statistics developed by Arellano and 
Bound (1991) revealed the absence of second-order correlation in the first residual differences; no problems 
were identified in the models. 
 (Insert Table 11) 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this study we analyzed the relationship between profitability, ownership concentration and insider ownership, 
extending the previous literature in this area, highlighting their endogenous nature and dynamics. The control of 
unobserved heterogeneity and individual endogeneity, provided by panel data the methodology and analysis of 
the interrelationships performed through the use of a system of simultaneous equations, allows role of ownership 
concentration and insider ownership to be evaluated as control mechanisms within the governance of small 
firms. 
To achieve this goal, several steps were taken. First, we analyzed the relationship between ownership 
concentration and corporate profitability through a quadratic specification, which is validated for the companies 
under study and for the subsamples generated from the criteria of size and age. When we segment the sample by 
the nature of ownership, the empirical evidence shows that the relationship is valid only for family businesses, in 
line with the potential benefits associated with these companies. The results are in line with those obtained by Hu 
et al. (2008) for Japanese family businesses. They confirm the relationship Arosa et al. (2010) formulated and 
which we were unable validate it in the context of unlisted Spanish companies and suggest a U-shaped 
relationship between ownership concentration and performance – the inverse of that obtained by Miguel et al. 
(2004) in a paper on listed companies. Nevertheless, for family businesses, the relationship differs depending on 
age – young companies show a negative relationship between ownership concentration and profitability for low 
levels of control rights, so that the expropriation hypothesis prevails; and they show a positive relationship for 
high levels of ownership concentration, as a consequence of the supervision hypothesis. 
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The next step reinforces the role of ownership concentration on profitability, when this is moderated by firm age. 
During the third step, the results confirm the entrenchment effect and the convergence of interests in the 
relationship established between the insider ownership and profitability. They do not validate, however, the 
cubic relationship established by Miguel et al. (2004).  
The inverse causality relationship tested in the fourth and fifth steps brings new evidence to the existing 
literature. The results are in line with the findings of studies conducted in the United States (e.g., Cho, 1998 and 
Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001) and validate the relationship not identified in Hu and Izumida (2008) and Arosa 
et al., (2010) on samples of similar companies to those used in our study.  
Results obtained in the estimation of the system of simultaneous equations suggest that the decisions of 
ownership concentration, insider ownership and profitability are not taken in isolation; rather, they are 
considered jointly. In the case of Portuguese SMEs, the institutional context in which they develop their activity, 
determines the existence of interdependence between these variables, leading to the need for an integrated and 
simultaneous analysis. 
Additional research is needed, in our view, to overcome some constraints found in this work. Firstly it is very 
difficult to carry out a comparative study between different institutional contexts due to the absence/scarcity of 
databases with unlisted companies, which allow the role of ownership concentration in disciplining 
managers/directors and business performance to be assessed in the absence of effective external control 
mechanisms. The lack of data also prevented us to make a clear distinction between the company's founder and 
other members, to assess the relevance of the “generation effect”.    
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Table 1. Variables used in the model. 
Variable Definition 
Economic Return on 
Assets 
ROAit = ROit/Ait, where ROit is the Operating Profitability and Ait is the Total Assets. It 
measures the capacity of the company’s assets to generate results. 
Ownership 
Concentration 
Cit expresses the holdings of the two largest partners/shareholders of the company’s 
equity. 
Insider Ownership  PIit is the equity held by whoever performs management duties. It gives the 
percentage of the ownership held by the managers/directors. 
Dummy Young/Mature  JMit is a dummy which is equal to 1 if the age of the company is lower than the mean 
and zero otherwise. 
Lagged Variable  X (t‐1) denotes that the variable X is lagging by one period. 
Time Dummy   D (t) is the dummy of period t 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics. 
Variable  Mean Standard Deviation 
ROA  0,07233 0,072945 
C  90,48618 18,22097 
C2  8.520,144 2582,261 
PI  73,56178 34,326 
PI2  6.589,562 3908,473 
PI3  61.4863,3 420040,6 
Idade  17,65765 11,49313 
 
 
Table 3. Sample segmenting criteria. 
Criterion Definition 
Age   
  Young  Age of the company is lower than the sample mean 
  Mature  Age of the company is higher than the sample mean 
Nature of Ownership   
   Family  Percentage of family in equity greater than 50% 
  Non‐Family  Percentage of family in equity less than 50% 
Size   
   Micro  Classification as a micro enterprise as defined by Decree‐Law No. 372/2007  
   Small  Classification as a small enterprise as defined by Decree‐Law No. 372/2007 
   Average  Classification as an average enterprise as defined by Decree‐Law No. 372/2007 
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Table 4. Results of estimation of impact of ownership concentration on profitability. 
 
    Sample  Size 
      Micro  Small  Average 
      I  II  III  IV 
     Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t|  Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t| Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t|  Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t|
   ROAit                                 
   ROAi(t‐1)  0,36560  0,032750  ***  0,34761 0,040515 ***  0,29735 0,104723 ***  0,28182  0,14601 * 
   Cit  ‐0,00043  0,000148  ***  ‐0,00075 0,000407 *  ‐0,00068 0,000342 **  ‐0,00089  0,000402 ** 
   C2it  3,16E‐06  0,000001  ***  4,64E‐06 0,000003 *  4,77E‐06 0,000002 **  7,76E‐06  0,000003 ** 
   D (t‐4)  0,06120  0,005928  ***  0,07967 0,015513 ***  0,07301 0,014280 ***  0,07669  0,017419 *** 
   D (t‐3)  0,05856  0,005950  ***  0,07617 0,015652 ***  0,07375 0,014602 ***  0,07107  0,016097 *** 
   D (t‐2)  0,05783  0,005972  ***  0,07624 0,015553 ***  0,07076 0,014741 ***  0,06774  0,015419 *** 
   D (t‐1)  0,06127  0,006014  ***  0,07814 0,015589 ***  0,07512 0,014721 ***  0,06884  0,015044 *** 
   D (t   )  0,04235  0,006144  ***  0,05178 0,015622 ***  0,06385 0,015066 ***  0,06117  0,015197 *** 
                                         
AR(2)    2,540    0,011  1,440   0,149 1,020   0,309  ‐0,640    0,521
AR(3)   1,040    0,297  1,130   0,258 0,260   0,797  ‐0,250    0,800
Hansen   17,850    0,022  15,050   0,239 18,140   0,020  6,210    0,624
 
 
 
Table 4. Results of estimation of impact of ownership concentration on profitability (continued). 
 
    Age  Nature of Ownership 
    Young  Mature  Family  Non‐Family 
      V  VI  VII  VIII 
     Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t|  Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t| Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t|  Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t| 
   ROAit                                 
  
ROAi(t‐
1)  0,33770  0,040234  ***  0,44287 0,052614 ***  0,37433 0,032751 ***  0,39225  0,091375 *** 
   Cit  ‐0,00048  0,000275  *  ‐0,00039 0,00015 **  ‐0,00029 0,000175 *  ‐0,00014  0,000316  
   C2it  3,21E‐06  0,000002  *  2,87E‐06 0,000001 ***  2,04E‐06 0,000001 *  1,34E‐06  0,000003  
   D (t‐4)  0,06727  0,010556  ***  0,05288 0,006445 ***  0,05556 0,006775 ***  0,06095  0,010897 *** 
   D (t‐3)  0,06513  0,010564  ***  0,04958 0,006625 ***  0,05338 0,006831 ***  0,05395  0,010955 *** 
   D (t‐2)  0,06580  0,01063  ***  0,04716 0,006618 ***  0,05249 0,006811 ***  0,05477  0,011329 *** 
   D (t‐1)  0,06989  0,010672  ***  0,05059 0,006649 ***  0,05563 0,006815 ***  0,06135  0,011823 *** 
   D (t   )  0,05188  0,01089  ***  0,03186 0,006782 ***  0,03695 0,006917 ***  0,03996  0,012432 *** 
                 
AR(2)    1,960    0,050  0,990   0,321 2,500   0,013  0,950    0,344
AR(3)   0,950    0,344  0,550   0,579 1,320   0,186  ‐0,100    0,917
Hansen   11,540    0,173  12,880   0,116 14,840   0,062  19,240    0,014
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Table 4. Results of estimation of impact of ownership concentration on profitability (continued). 
    Family  Non‐Family 
    Young  Mature  Young  Mature 
      IX  X  XI  XII 
     Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t|  Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t| Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t|  Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t|
   ROAit                                 
  
ROAi(t‐
1)  0,35584  0,0405592  ***  0,43872 0,053639 ***  0,21690 0,128569 *  0,55097  0,107733 *** 
   Cit  ‐0,00058  0,0003073  *  ‐0,00018 0,000218   ‐0,00046 0,000534   ‐0,00009  0,000352  
   C2it  3,62E‐06  2,03E‐06  *  1,27E‐06 1,47E‐06   4,12E‐06 4,54E‐06   8,25E‐07  3,26E‐06  
   D (t‐4)  0,07053  0,0117246  ***  0,04577 0,008412 ***  0,08390 0,016454 ***  0,04495  0,012507 *** 
   D (t‐3)  0,06887  0,0117487  ***  0,04279 0,008585 ***  0,07523 0,017462 ***  0,03728  0,013616 *** 
   D (t‐2)  0,06919  0,0117327  ***  0,04073 0,00856 ***  0,07944 0,017458 ***  0,03574  0,013299 *** 
   D (t‐1)  0,07309  0,0117569  ***  0,04330 0,008499 ***  0,08579 0,018076 ***  0,04292  0,014005 *** 
   D (t   )  0,05499  0,0119711  ***  0,02539 0,008645 ***  0,06912 0,020407 ***  0,02131  0,014678  
                             
AR(2)    1,840    0,065  0,990   0,321 0,840   0,400  0,760    0,448
AR(3)   0,720    0,472  1,010   0,314 0,920   0,356  ‐0,680    0,498
Hansen   9,410    0,309  11,940   0,154 8,580   0,379  11,710    0,164
Notes: 
The information required to interpret the tables is as follows: i) estimating the data was performed using GMM estimators as 
dynamic panel data using xtabond2 developed by David Roodman (2006); ii) ***, ** and * indicate the significance level at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively, iii) to eliminate the individual effects, the model was estimated after considering the first 
differences for the variables iv) Arellano and Bond (AR) is a test of the autocorrelation of errors developed in order to verify if 
there are lags that are not valid instruments, v) Hansen is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as 
χ2 under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the instruments and the error term. 
 
 
Table 5. Results of the estimation of the impact of ownership concentration on profitability, with the moderating 
effect of age.  
 
      Sample 
     Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t| 
   ROAit         
   ROAi(t‐1)  0,36906 0,032617 *** 
   Cit  ‐0,00051 0,000154 *** 
   C2it  3,73E‐06 1,12E‐06 *** 
  Cit  JMi 2,15E‐04 0,000099 ** 
  C2itJMi ‐1,75E‐06 1,02E‐06 * 
   D (t‐4)  0,05988 0,005842 *** 
   D (t‐3)  0,05737 0,005863 *** 
   D (t‐2)  0,05686 0,005886 *** 
   D (t‐1)  0,06056 0,005934 *** 
   D (t   )  0,04184 0,006070 *** 
AR(2)    2,56   0,01
AR(3)   1,07   0,284
Hansen   18,08   0,054
*** Significant at1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 6. Results of the estimation of the impact insider ownership on profitability. 
 
    Insider Ownership 
      Linear  Squared  Cubic 
      I      II      III   
     Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t|  Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t|  Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t| 
   ROAit                         
   ROAi(t‐1)  0,36615  0,032749  ***  0,36706 0,032709 ***  0,36719  0,03271 *** 
   PIit  ‐0,00011  0,000022  ***  ‐0,00038 0,000086 ***  ‐0,00061  0,00022 *** 
   PI2it         2,38E‐06 0,000001 ***  8,56E‐06  4,96E‐06 * 
  PI3it                ‐3,95E‐08  3,04E‐08  
   D (t‐4)  0,05735  0,003467  ***  0,06094 0,004009 ***  0,06150  0,00413 *** 
   D (t‐3)  0,05452  0,003518  ***  0,05812 0,004056 ***  0,05867  0,00418 *** 
   D (t‐2)  0,05372  0,003549  ***  0,05735 0,004085 ***  0,05791  0,00421 *** 
   D (t‐1)  0,05712  0,003551  ***  0,06078 0,004090 ***  0,06135  0,00422 *** 
   D (t   )  0,03791  0,003727  ***  0,04161 0,004267 ***  0,04217  0,00439 *** 
           
AR(2)    2,56    0,010 2,57   0,010 2,57    0,010
AR(3)   1,04    0,299 1,03   0,303 1,03    0,301
Hansen   15,27    0,018 15,4   0,017 15,43    0,017
*** Significant at1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at 10% level. 
 
Table 7. Results of the estimation of the impact of profitability on ownership concentration on yield grounds.  
 
      Sample 
     Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t| 
   Cit         
   Ci(t‐1)  0,05388 0,081832  
   ROAit        
   ROAi(t‐1)  191,16210 77,098000 ** 
   D (t‐4)  ‐0,64643 0,149352 *** 
   D (t‐3)  ‐0,51151 0,173992 *** 
   D (t‐2)  ‐0,12561 0,112239  
   D (t‐1)  0,69834 0,221077 *** 
     
AR(2)    ‐2,500   0,012
AR(3)   ‐0,380   0,701
Hansen   5,980   0,112
*** Significant at1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 8. Estimation of impact of profitability on insider ownership. 
 
      Sample 
     Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t| 
   PIit        
   PIi(t‐1)  0,14744 0,081506 * 
   ROAit  ‐35,02412 7,595487 *** 
  ROAi(t‐1)  ‐9,40107 2,873151 *** 
   D (t‐4)  5,98738 0,587962 *** 
   D (t‐3)  5,35080 0,517579 *** 
   D (t‐2)  3,78319 0,410201 *** 
   D (t‐1)  3,20760 0,321417 *** 
     
AR(2)    0,81   0,418
AR(3)   ‐1,18   0,239
Hansen   24,88   0,024
*** Significant at1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at 10% level. 
 
Table 9. Study of endogeneity – result of estimation: ordinary least squares (OLE). 
 
      ROA  C.P.  P.I. 
      Equação I      Equação II   Equação III 
     Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t| Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t| Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t| 
   Constant   0,07312  0,002406 *** 82,05333 0,299844 ***   42,37432  1,097021 *** 
   ROA    7,961582 1,564337 *** ‐36,6818  2,925719 ***
   C.P.  0,00013  0,000026 *** 0,374723  1,097021 ***
   P.I.   ‐0,00017  0,000026 *** 0,106566 0,0033274 ***  
*** Significant at1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at 10% level. 
 
Table 10. Results of the estimation of the system of simultaneous equations. 
      ROA  C.P.  P.I. 
      Equation I      Equation II    Equation III 
     Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t| Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t| Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t| 
   Constant  0,069208  0,002405 *** 73,94570 0,295676 ***  13,60307  1,077252 *** 
   ROA    19,28922 1,563354 *** ‐74,3318  2,961648 ***
   C.P.  0,000319  0,000259 *** 0,722829  0,011474 ***
   P.I.  ‐0,000350  0,002405 *** 0,205554 0,003262 ***  
*** Significant at1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 11. Results of Model I with by use of different estimators. 
                           
                    
     
Ordinary least squres 
estimator   Within‐Groups estimator  First Diference GMM  System GMM 
         I        II        III        IV    
     Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t| Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t| Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t|  Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t|
   ROAit                                 
   ROAi(‐1)t  0,64435  0,022879  ***  0,13015 0,029984 ***  0,15562 0,054694  ***  0,36560 0,032750 *** 
   Cit  ‐0,00031  0,000116  ***  ‐0,00048 0,000241 **  ‐0,00030 0,000218    ‐0,00043 0,000149 *** 
   C2it  2,22E‐06  0,000001  ***  3,37E‐06 0,000002 *  1,68E‐06 0,000002    3,16E‐06 0,000001 *** 
   D (t‐4)  0,01991  0,001492  ***  (dropped)     0,03865 0,006906  ***  0,06120 0,005929 *** 
   D (t‐3)  0,01666  0,001463  ***  ‐0,00227 0,000976 **  0,02721 0,003480  ***  0,05856 0,005950 *** 
   D (t‐2)  0,01574  0,001440  ***  ‐0,00435 0,000996 ***  0,02062 0,002864  ***  0,05783 0,005973 *** 
   D (t‐1)  0,02012  0,001456  ***  ‐0,00116 0,001090   0,02203 0,002552  ***  0,06127 0,006014 *** 
   D (t)  (dropped)      ‐0,01991 0,001476 ***         0,04235 0,006145 *** 
                    
                                         
AR(2) in first dif.:   Z =                   1,610   0,108  2,540   0,011
AR(3) in first dif.:   Z =                   1,250   0,210  1,040   0,297
Hansen test: Chi2 =                  1,220   0,543  17,850   0,022
                                         
*** Significant at1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at 10% level. 
 
